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Making Sense of Rework: Reflections from the 
Blunt and Sharp End in Projects 
 
Abstract 
Rework is a chronic problem in complex construction, engineering resource (e.g. minerals and 
energy) projects. It is a significant contributor to cost and schedule overruns and can have an 
adverse impact on safety. Yet, there is a notable dearth of theory that adequately explains rework 
occurrence. This research narrows this knowledge gap by adopting a retrospective sensemaking 
perspective to determine how and why rework arises. Staff from organizations operating at the 
blunt end (e.g. clients and design engineers providing finance and information) and those at the 
sharp end (e.g. contractors at the 'coalface') of a project’s supply chain were interviewed to make 
sense of rework that occurred. The analysis identified an overarching need for managers to de-
emphasize the environment that prioritizes production over all other considerations. Rather, 
mechanisms and factors that shape the performance of people should be systematically examined 
to ensure that projects are delivered safely, on time, to budget and to the specified level of 
quality. Limitations of the research and the implications for managerial practice are also 
identified. 
 
Keywords: Rework, error, offshore projects, retrospection, production pressure, learning 
 
1. Introduction 
Rework is a chronic and recurrent problem in construction, engineering and natural resource (i.e. 
oil, gas, mineral sands) projects which adversely impacts upon project performance, productivity 
and safety [1,2]. Surprisingly, rework has largely been ignored and deemed to be a normal 
function of operations [3], and often deliberately concealed [4]. As rework fundamentally 
pertains to correcting errors arising from unanticipated events, the question then is “How do we 
anticipate it when, by definition, its occurrence is unanticipated?” [5]. Rework costs are 
implicitly accommodated within a project’s traditional cost contingency [6], yet an allowance for 
rework is unacceptable to clients as it is deemed to be something that should not occur. Indeed, 
contractual tenders that include cost, time and disruption due to rework render consultants and 
contractors potentially uncompetitive. With increasingly tighter profit margins and lower 
productivity rates being experienced, particularly in Australia1, rework is untenable as business 
competitiveness is severely jeopardized. To prevent rework, various approaches are being 
promulgated and include visualization technologies, modularization, lean construction and 
                                                          
1 Refer to www.gattan.edu.au, 
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relationship contracting [6].  Such approaches may yield some project performance improvement 
but merely abate rework, as human behavior is all too adept at concealing problems and 
committing errors [4]. 
 
People conceal rework from managers in a vain attempt to protect them from ‘bad news’ and/or 
present information that does not adhere to their beliefs [4]. This practice of hiding mistakes is 
institutionalized in many organizations [4].  In fact, Roth and Kliener [7] reported an inherent 
cultural mandate established within some engineering organizations of concealing problems 
unless accompanied by a solution. Thus, in this instance, concealment becomes standard practice 
[4]. In some ways this position marries with the notion of strategic misrepresentation (i.e. in 
effect, lying) to explain why projects experience cost overruns [8]. 
 
Those project team members that abrogate their direct responsibility and remain silent about 
problems do so to avoid a reprimand from their immediate manager. Moreover, team members 
collude to conceal knowledge of errors and/or omissions by revealing the issues that need to be 
addressed to the project manager [4].  Under such circumstances, project costs and the schedule 
apparently will remain the same and they avoid blame. However, if they reveal that errors or 
omission have been caused by others, this provides project managers with the opportunity to 
attend to them with other project team members being blamed for the cost and schedule overruns 
that may occur. However, should all project team members reveal all the known problems, 
project cost increases and the schedule slips - and all are apportioned blame from the 
management which results in a negative outcome for project team members concerned to 
produce a lose-lose outcome [4].  
 
Failure to admit a negative outcome and pursue a course of action can contribute to rework [9]. 
This behavior is referred to as defensive avoidance [10].  Shaw [11] provides several reasons 
why such behavior materializes. First, people pursue a course of action in spite of negative 
feedback largely because of the negative feedback [11]. This argument suggests that people 
value tenacity and perseverance, and admire those who stick to their principles. It also suggests 
that people can adopt a valued characteristic of forsaking a more rational approach to difficult 
decision situations to ensure consistency? 
 
Contemporary rework research has narrowly focused upon identifying specific causation factors 
[12-15]. This approach is however, counterintuitive as rework causation can only be understood 
by reviewing the whole project system in which it occurs and examining how variables 
dynamically interact with one another [16,17]. Within this context, an operational system, such 
as a construction, engineering or resource project, can be categorized as having ‘blunt’ and 
‘sharp’ ends [18].  The ‘sharp end’ represents the project site where people are carrying out 
physical work associated with project delivery. Whereas the ‘blunt end’ encompasses the 
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organization(s) that support, drive and shape the activities of the design and construction process. 
The ‘blunt end’ (which includes governments, regulatory bodies, financial institutions and 
clients) provides information to facilitate design and construction, but invariably introduces 
project cost and time constraints. Strategic decisions taken at the ‘blunt end’ can create, shape 
and stimulate opportunities for errors to materialize [18]. Too often, time constraints restrict 
design related activities and lead to incomplete tasks and/or inadequately prepared processes 
[19]. When rework occurs, and time constraints are imposed, and there is then a propensity for 
the formation of ‘vicious circles’2 to significantly increase [20]. 
 
There is a notable lack of theory to explain why rework occurs in construction, engineering and 
resource projects. Thus, the research presented here aims to contribute to narrowing this 
knowledge gap through the lens of retrospective sensemaking [21]. The adoption of retrospective 
sensemaking can facilitate a deeper understanding of issues that contribute to rework and provide 
a means to inform and direct actions to mitigate its occurrence. A detailed review of the 
normative rework literature is presented to provide a sense of the extant knowledge and 
associated gaps that the research aims to fill. Organizations operating at the ‘blunt’ and ‘sharp’ 
ends are interviewed to make sense of the rework that occurred on their projects. Understanding 
rework in this way provides the feedback required to develop a foundation for learning to occur. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Terms such as quality deviation, non-conformances, quality failures, and defects are often 
considered to be synonymous with rework [22,23]. Because these terms are used 
interchangeably, a degree of ambiguity with regard to the definition of rework exists [24.25]. For 
example, the terms ‘quality failure’ and ‘defects’ were used to define rework or errors in the 
same study [26-29]. Put simply, rework can be defined as “the unnecessary effort of re-doing a 
process or activity that was incorrectly implemented the first time” [30]. The Construction 
Industry Institute [31] confine rework to the sharp end and defines it as “activities that have to be 
done more than once or activities that remove work previously installed as part of the project”. 
However, it should be acknowledged that some activities or processes implemented correctly 
might require adjustment due to changes in client or end-user requirements [32]. 
 
Ultimately, errors occur due to the physiological and/or psychological limitations of humans 
[33]. However, whether individuals can justifiably be blamed for all errors is a contentious 
matter, as making mistakes is an innate characteristic of human nature [33]. Human errors occur 
for various reasons, and different actions are required to prevent or avoid them.  Specifically, 
errors can arise due to mistakes of commission (doing something incorrectly) or mistakes of 
omission (not doing what should have been done or doing something out of sequence). An 
                                                          
2 Williams et al., [73] state that “Increasing cross relations between concurrent activities increase activity duration, which under time constraints 
causes activities to become more parallel and hence increases cross relations” (p.151) 
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individual’s training, experience or competence does not necessarily prevent errors or omissions 
[34].  Admitting errors can, however, lead to blame and may result in legal proceedings, which is 
why design professionals (e.g. engineers) and contractors have been unable or unwilling to fully 
realize the potential of learning from errors [35-36]. 
 
Edmonson [37] observed that executives, for example, are often faced with a false dichotomy, 
that is: “How can they respond constructively to failures without giving rise to an anything goes 
attitude. If people aren’t blamed for all failure what will ensure they try as hard as possible to do 
their best work?” (p.50). Drawing upon Edmonson’s [37] work, a continuum is presented in 
Figure 1 to determine those errors that are praiseworthy and blameworthy (i.e. denoted by the 
dotted line in Figure 1).  
 
 
Adapted from Edmonson [37] 
Figure 1. Error continuum 
 
Commission and omission errors warrant blame but a lack of skill and knowledge is attributable 
to the organization which should ensure that individuals are occupationally competent. In the 
case of task orientation, an employee could be stressed and/or fatigued due to tight time 
constraints being imposed. In this case, the individual’s manager is responsible for the employee 
failing. The key research question therefore is what circumstances lead to such time constraints 
being imposed? In this instance, an understanding of context is needed as it “binds people to 
actions that they must justify and it affects the saliency of information, and it provides the norms 
and expectations that constrain explanations” [17,38]. A key proposition of this research is that 
developing a rich understanding of rework causation and contexts can help avoid the ‘blame 
game’ and institute an effective strategy for learning to emerge. 
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Only the experience acquired from committing an error can engender learning and lower the risk 
of reoccurrence [24]. Yet, organizations with high reliability3 may be anxious that errors or 
potential failures are embedded within ongoing activities. Especially as unexpected failure 
modes and the limitations of foresight may amplify the error [39].  For organizations 
participating in such projects trying to maintain a high reliability status they need to: i) 
continually make sense of their environment; and ii) learn from reports and identify the risks 
embedded within processes and systems at the project’s operational, tactical and strategic levels. 
This task may be particularly arduous when contracts involve multiple organizations, each with 
potentially conflicting goals, objectives and organizational cultures. Within the realm of 
understanding human error, Dekker [18] suggests that (p.71): 
 
 past situations should be 
reconstructed and documented by other people in a way that considers assertions about 
unobservable psychological mechanisms; and 
 there are systemic connections 
between situations and behavior, that is, between what people did and what actually 
happened in the environment around them.   
 
The connection between situations and behavior is bi-directional as people change the situation 
by doing what they do and by managing their processes [18].  Yet, an evolving situation also 
alters people’s understanding and behavior, and allows changes to be undertaken. Under such 
circumstances, connections between the situation and behavior can be uncovered, investigated, 
documented and represented graphically [18,40] using techniques such as cause-effect, causal 
loop and fault tree [16,17,40-42].  To understand human error, knowledge of the individual’s 
working environment and situation is required (which includes tasks undertaken, and tools and 
technology used). Answers to the question “what’s the story?” are therefore addressed such that 
plausible answers gain their validity from subsequent activity [21]. 
 
2.1 Quantification: The Need for Context 
Studies have typically quantified rework according to its cost as a proportion of contract value, 
its type (e.g. change, error and omission), or by subcontract trade and building element (e.g., 
substructure, superstructure, internal and external finishes and services) [43-46]. The 
Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB, 1989) in Singapore estimated that between 
5% and 10% of total project costs are associated with doing things erroneously and rectifying 
them [47]. The CIDB concluded that adoption of an effective quality management system would 
reduce rework to anywhere between 0.1% and 0.5% of total project cost [47].  The Construction 
Industry Development Agency in Australia revealed that projects without a formal quality 
                                                          
3 In this context, such as those involved in the construction of a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Plant, where safety is the priority. 
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system in place (and procured using a traditional lump sum contract) experienced rework costs in 
excess of 15% of their contract value [48]. Contrastingly, an analysis of 260 construction and 
engineering projects revealed that rework costs did not significantly vary by project size (i.e. 
contract value), procurement method and project type adopted [49].  Hwang et al. [12] concurred 
with Love’s findings [49] and found no significant differences for rework costs by project size, 
and work type (i.e. construct only or design and construct). However, Hwang et al. [12] 
identified an increase in rework costs between light industrial, heavy industrial and various 
buildings types - probably because of varying and increased design complexity. 
 
The reported costs of rework identified within the extant literature vary significantly and range 
from 3% to 25% of a project’s contract value [50].  Research suggests that this is primarily due 
to a lack of a standardized and robust methodology for its determination [50,51].  Some studies 
have excluded change orders and errors due to off-site manufacture that result in rework being 
undertaken [1,52] and increasing emphasis has been placed on simply determining direct rework 
costs. However, the intangible costs associated with disruption and schedule delays that arise 
have been overlooked as an additional cost [35].  Rework may also have a multiplier effect of up 
to six times the actual (direct) cost of rectification [53,54].  Yet, such costs are not apportioned to 
the client or contractor but rather ‘forced’ down the supply chain to subcontractors and suppliers. 
Such additional costs can adversely impact these firms’ profitability and survival that are 
typically small-to-medium sized firms, dependent upon having a positive cash flow [54]. 
 
However, understanding the circumstances that form the setting in which errors and subsequent 
rework occurs is a critical part of the process of reducing their occurrence.  Dekker [18] 
specifically states: “knowledge of context is critical to understanding error. Answers to why 
people do what they do often lie in the context surrounding their actions. Counting errors and 
stuffing them away in a measurement instrument removes that context” (p.68). The 
establishment of a context that focuses on ‘retrospective decisiveness’ should be stimulated, 
which, according to Weick et al. [21] is similar to learning in reverse (p.184). Through this 
process, people can learn from their errors or reconstruct a history that summarizes lessons learnt 
into a single narrative. Such an approach can increase an individual’s confidence and enable 
them to act more decisively in the future. Weick (1995) suggests that confidence is a key 
determinant for ‘environmental enactment’, for instance, managers can utilize workplace systems 
and processes that they anticipate will reduce and contain the incidence of rework. This approach 
may trigger a process of unlearning that challenges the underlying concepts, paradigms, and the 
Weltanschauung that has determined their historical way of thinking. 
 
2.2 Design and Construction: The Known and Unknown 
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Smith and Eppinger [55] contend that the proportion of money and time spent on rework in the 
product design phase can be significantly higher than the construction phase. This is because the 
design engineering process is inherently iterative as it strives to solve coupled problems with 
complex relationships. The situation within construction is the opposite as design costs are often 
less than one percent of the life-cycle cost of a project or less than 10% of the total construction 
value [56]. While design costs are minimal, it is the single most important influence on total 
project expenditure. It is during the design process that errors and omissions materialize (as 
contributors to rework), and occur due to embedded dysfunctional organizational practices, 
‘pluralistic ignorance’, unreasonable cost estimates and schedule constraints being imposed upon 
the project team by clients [57].  Such unreasonableness may be attributable to clients' optimism 
bias and their inexperience with the project delivery process.  This may well be expected as most 
clients only ever build once and even those who construct on a regular basis rarely use the same 
team to deliver their requirements [58]. 
 
A plethora of academic, industry and government reports produced have acknowledged the need 
for clients to change their approach to delivering projects in order to enhance productivity and 
performance. Yet, despite the persuasive arguments put forward, clients remain generally 
reluctant to embrace the recommendations proposed (e.g., shift away from the use of competitive 
tendering, the use of relationship contracting, and technologies that utilize aspects of Building 
Information Modeling) [6].  Regardless of ‘value for money’ aspirations, clients have a 
proclivity to steer themselves toward the lowest price, irrespective of the long-term financial 
consequences [58]. In some instances therefore, clients may subconsciously trade-off lowest 
price (i.e. both with consultants and contractors) with the possibility of scope changes to 
unconsciously create rework during construction - the extent of which remains unknown at the 
time of exchanging contracts.  
 
The fixing of a project’s governance, delivery strategy (including responsibility and risk 
allocation) and technology influences the ability to establish an effective generative project 
culture that focuses on accomplishing a common goal and good team performance (i.e. doing 
what everyone is supposed to do) [59]. On this point, Love et al. [58] examined the influence of 
strategic decisions at the formative stages of a project and proposed the following orthodoxy: 
“competitive tendering for selecting design consultants’ projects establishes an environment 
where their services are reduced or omitted to maximize profit.  The omission of critical tasks 
and practices such as design audits, reviews and verifications leads to contract documentation 
being erroneously produced and therefore increases the propensity for rework occurring during 
construction” (p.569). 
 
Conventional project planning and monitoring techniques do not acknowledge or measure 
rework and tasks are either deemed ‘to be done’, ‘in process’ or ‘done’ [60].  In contrast, the 
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rework cycle is best described as an archetypal dynamic structure [70,71].  The rework cycle is 
presented in Figure 2 and provides a description of workflow, which incorporates rework and 
undiscovered rework. Work rate is determined by staff skills, productivity and their availability; 
as project time advances, the amount of work remaining reduces. Work is completed (i.e. work 
done) or becomes undiscovered rework depending on the quality (the proportion of work 
undertaken completely and correctly). Undiscovered work contains errors that remain undetected 
and are perceived to have been undertaken. The quality of work produced may fall below the 
required standards and errors may still occur.  Errors are often not immediately identifiable 
(latent) and only transpire after a period of incubation in the system [72]. As time progresses, 
these errors are eventually detected and rework is identified, snowballing staff workload [70,73]. 
 
The extent of rework required is dependent upon how long the latent error has remained 
undetected. For instance, a dimensional error or spatial conflict contained within the engineering 
design may not transpire until the project is physically constructed on-site. If the error 
necessitates a major change, the entire perceived progress prior to the error occurring may be 
considered wasted. Addressing the error not only generates more work for individuals but also 
increases the possibility of more errors being generated. This is denoted by the main cycle loop 
in the model, which is a reinforcing loop (indicated by R). Importantly, the balancing loops, 
denoted by B, should counteract the accumulation of work remaining. The gap between 
perceived and actual progress may be difficult to close; it may appear that all work is nearly 
complete, but the project can persistently remain at a frustrating 90 percent level of completion 
[73,74]. Poor progress rates occur mainly when staff involved with tasks either leave (staff 
turnover) or become unavailable and replacement staff are needed to complete the tasks.   
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Figure 2. The rework cycle [74] 
 
The discontinuity of design staff significantly impacts upon design process performance [73,74]. 
This is because the inherent project knowledge held by each staff member cannot be seamlessly 
transferred directly from one individual to another, even if a hand-over ‘transition’ period (and/or 
de-briefing) occurs. Even in-house staff recruited cannot acquire sufficiently detailed knowledge 
immediately after commencing work on site and so an initial project absorption period is needed. 
In practice, activities are executed at varying levels, depending upon the individual’s skill and 
competence, and this can lead to compromises in quality. Within the rework cycle it is assumed 
that inexperienced people are more likely to commit more errors. This assumption may be true 
but Reason [75] contends that often, highly qualified and competent individuals commit most 
mistakes with the worst consequences.  Cooper [70,71] suggests that the quality and the error 
discovery rate are important factors that should be considered. Purely bolstering a project with 
additional resources will not resolve fundamental problems; a more pre-emptive approach should 
be utilized to reduce the number of errors and the time taken over their detection [74]. 
 
The rework cycle provides a systemic overview of project behavior but it fails to contextualize 
rework causation for organizations to learn from experience. Rather, the underlying contextual 
conditions influence people’s ability to learn from errors [76].  Dixon [77] notes that it is the 
ability to retrospectively find patterns in the continual flow of daily workplace activities that give 
those events meaning. When insights and knowledge are acquired about rework causation within 
a given context, changes to prevent and reduce its negative consequences can be implemented 
11 
 
[78]. A key obstacle preventing achievement of these goals has been the inability to understand 
how to specify the contexts in which rework might occur as previous research has tended to 
focus upon identifying a singular root cause.  
 
3. Research Approach 
To determine the systemic nature of rework the ontology of ‘subjective idealism’ is adopted due 
to the limited discourse in this specific field of research, particularly oil and gas projects [79]. 
For this approach, individuals construct their own views and opinions on the phenomena under 
investigation based upon their experiences; an inclination to truth and pragmatism is deemed to 
prevail. Sensemaking is used to underpin the ontology adopted, as meaning is given to 
experience, dialogue and narratives about events that have occurred through the process of 
retrospection [80,81]. The notion of ‘retrospective sensemaking’ is derived from Schutz’s [82] 
analysis of ‘meaningful experience’ where events occur in a moment of time and can exist in 
pure duration and as discrete segments. Pure duration can be described as a “stream of 
experience” [83].  Experience is a singular construct that is a “coming-to-be and passing-away 
that has no contours, no boundaries and no differentiation” [82].  
 
Experiences in this context, however, imply distinct, separate episodes [81]. The creation of 
meaning from experience(s) is reliant upon a temporal process of attention being directed 
backward to specific time periods; so whatever presently occurs will influence future discoveries 
when people analyze the past [21,81,84].  Furthermore, memories are events that occur in a 
given period of time, so anything that affects a person’s ability to remember also affects the same 
sense that is made of those memories.  With this in mind, Wieck [81] refers of Fischoff [85] 
states that ‘creep determinism’ can prevail, especially “when people who already know the 
outcome of a complex prior history of tangled, indeterminate events remember that history as 
being much more determinant, leading inevitably to the outcome they already knew” (p.28). 
Consequently, determinant histories can be reconstructed differently [81], which is akin to a 
postmodern cultural view, as one person may experience the same phenomenon differently from 
another [86,87]. For example, if an outcome is perceived to be bad, then antecedents are 
reconstructed to emphasize incorrect actions and inaccurate perceptions even if they were not 
influential or obvious at the time [81]. In this instance, retrospective sensemaking implies that 
errors and subsequent rework should be anticipated and reduced through a process of ‘good 
project management’. The future is indeterminate, and the past is reconstructed knowing an 
outcome, thus past events are rarely accurately recalled. Reason [33] asserts that the “knowledge 
of the outcome of a previous event increases the perceived likelihood of that outcome” (p.91) 
which can lead people to overestimate their ability to influence future events. This phenomenon 
is known as the ‘illusion of control’ [88]. Organizations with a strong desire and willingness to 
reduce rework within projects require an interpretation of past indeterminacy that favors order 
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and oversimplifies causality [33]. This approach facilitates a meaningful context as to ‘why’ and 
‘how’ rework materialized and provides insights that help construct invaluable lessons on how to 
mitigate future rework. 
 
3.1 Face-to-Face Interviews 
The more complex the subject matter, the richer the communication medium needs to be, with 
the richest form being face-to-face interviews [40]. Face-to-face interviews provide more clues 
in terms of tone of voice, facial expression, and body language - all of which assist the 
interviewee to make informed adjustments about the topic of inquiry. For this reason, Dixon [77] 
recommends sensemaking conversations need to be held face-to-face, as do conversation 
invitations and the communication of results.   
 
Using this approach interviews were undertaken with two organizations [an operator (i.e. blunt 
end) and contractor (i.e. sharp end)] that had extensive involvement and experience in delivering 
oil and gas projects in Australia. They were systematically selected for this research because they 
were market leaders and actively involved in the delivery of offshore projects. For the oil and gas 
operator, 23 in-depth interviews were conducted with a variety of personnel that had been 
involved with constructing off-shore floating structures such as Floating Production Storage and 
Offloading (FPSO) vessels, Tension Leg Platforms and Jacket Platforms. Interviewees included 
a general manager (1), operations managers (2), project managers (10), structural engineers (3), 
procurement managers (2), business managers (2), and engineering managers (3). The contractor 
was involved in the design, installation and commissioning of electrical and instrumentation 
(E&I) engineering systems. Interviews were also undertaken with the Managing Director, 
Business Development Manager, Engineers (8) and Draftsmen (6). 
 
The research team collaborated with a direct contact point within the participating operator and 
contractor who had an interest in understanding ‘why’ and ‘how’ rework emerged in their 
projects. For reasons of commercial confidentially, specific details about the organization and 
individuals interviewed are not presented. All interviews were conducted at the interviewees’ 
offices for their convenience. Interviews were digitally recorded and subsequently transcribed 
verbatim to allow for finer nuances of the discussions to be documented. Handwritten notes were 
also taken during the interview to record any notable facial expressions, gesticulations, or other 
body language that could assist with the line of inquiry. The interviewees’ details were coded to 
preserve anonymity, although all interviewees were aware that their identities might be revealed 
from the textural narrative. The interview format was kept as consistent as possible and followed 
the emergent rework themes identified within the extant literature. 
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The semi-structured interview commenced by asking individuals about their experience within 
industry, and their current role within the organization. Interviewees were then invited to: select 
a completed project they had worked on; identify a particular rework incident that had occurred; 
and explain how and why it arose from their perspective. Phrases such as ‘tell me about it’ or 
‘can you give me an example’ were asked at opportune moments when further information was 
required. These open questions allowed for avenues of interest to be pursued without introducing 
bias in the response. Interviewees were asked to identify sources of rework that occurred during 
the project’s construction phase and suggest appropriate rework mitigation strategies. Interviews 
varied in duration (between one to three hours) and sought to engender conversation while 
simultaneously creating a positive interpersonal rapport between the interviewer and interviewee. 
A copy of each interview transcript was given to each interviewee to check overall validity and 
accuracy. In conjunction with the interviews, documentary sources for each project discussed 
were provided.  
 
3.2 Data Analysis 
The textural narratives compiled were analyzed using QSR N5 which is a version of NUD*IST 
and combines the efficient management of non-numerical, unstructured data with powerful 
processes of indexing and theorizing. QSR N5 enabled additional data sources and journal notes 
to be incorporated into the analysis as well as identify emergent new themes. The development 
and re-assessment of themes, as the analysis progressed, accords with calls to avoid confining 
data to pre-determined sets of categories [89]. Kvale [90] suggests that ad hoc methods for 
generating meaning enable the researcher to access “a variety of common-sense approaches to 
interview text using an interplay of techniques such as noting patterns, seeing plausibility, 
making comparisons etc.” (p.204).  
 
4. Research Findings 
Transcript analysis obtained from the operator revealed that the interviewees had been involved 
with the same projects and coincidently identified specific rework events that had an impact on 
the project’s performance. The analysis also identified that interviewees had a different 
understanding of the events leading to rework. This was expected as a person’s sensemaking is a 
unique property of their physiology, self-consciousness and culture, experience and social and 
intellectual needs. The interviewees’ memories of the event were reliant on the context (which 
they sensed and interpreted), as well as the new context that they were in when attempting to 
remember details of the event. In the case of the contractor, the interviewees were all involved 
with the re-engineering of an FPSO’s ‘fire damaged’ safety control system.  
 
Uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity were inherent characteristics associated with the design, 
engineering and construction of the projects identified in this study, but also oil and gas in 
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general. The projects experienced time and cost overruns and operated in hazardous 
environments using high-end technology. The operator and contractor identified safety and the 
influence of operations on the environment as being paramount. Both organizations had a 
preoccupation with failure and had rigorous systems and processes to ensure a data-centric 
workflow was in place to track for lapses and errors. This was particularly the case for the 
operator when developing their Process Flow Diagram (PFD) and Process and Instrumentation 
Diagram (P&ID) in order to maintain data consistency with process information, line sizing data, 
and instrumentation and equipment definitions for their projects. For example, a 3D plant 
conceptual design model, plant design reviews, corrosion risk assessment and simulations 
formed an integral part of the pre-Front-End Engineering Design (FEED) phase. During FEED 
and construction, processes were in place for reporting near misses, process upsets and small and 
localized failures (e.g., HAZOP/Safety Reviews). Identifying errors was an organizational 
obsession, yet rework still occurred thus contributing to cost and schedule overruns, and poor 
productivity. 
 
In many instances, rework was perceived by those interviewees at the ‘blunt end’ to be an 
expected ‘norm’ during the construction of projects despite an overarching organizational 
fixation with error mitigation.  Interviewees of the operator indicated that project construction 
costs tended to be inflated by 5% to 7% due to rework which was perceived to be acceptable.  
One project manager stated: “if rework costs were kept at these levels then a project was deemed 
to be a good job”. Conversely, the contractor viewed rework as unacceptable as it reduced profits 
and jeopardized safety. Nonetheless, if the rework arose due to a ‘change’ then the cost of 
rectification was invariably reimbursable. If a documentation omission or error occurred, then 
the contractor’s likelihood of recovering additional costs (associated with productivity and 
rework losses) would be negligible even though such costs are significant. The contractor 
suggested that additional costs of 10% to 15% of capital expenditure (CAPEX) were often 
incurred due to erroneous engineering documentation produced in haste to commence production 
as early as possible. The operator’s employees identified a number of offshore projects that had 
experienced significant rework and the most common example discussed related to a new-build 
FPSO, which is examined in this paper.   
 
4.1 Blunt End: New-Build FPSO 
The FPSO construction formed part of a major oil field development valued in excess of AU$1 
billion. It was the operator’s first new-build project and was commissioned to connect five 
subsea production wells, spread across two fields. The connected wells consisted of vertical, 
deviated and horizontal well bores with single-chrome completions. The FPSO’s engineering 
design was undertaken by various consultants in Europe (e.g., Norway, Monaco, and the 
Netherlands) and Korea, with the operator’s staff present in each location to provide design 
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input. The original contract for the hull was awarded to a Korean shipyard, which was later 
assigned to a European consortium. The topside’s contract was awarded to a European firm and 
constructed in two separate yards. The FPSO was integrated and constructed in Singapore and 
therefore, the hull had to be towed from Korea and the modules floated from Europe. It was 
estimated that rework experienced during the FPSO’s construction was approximately 30 
percent% to 35% of its CAPEX. Due to commercial sensitivity, the FPSO’s final cost was not 
provided but interviewees openly and candidly conversed about the issues that they perceived to 
have contributed to rework being experienced. In Figure 3, four core themes emerged from the 
analysis of transcripts: (1) circumstance, (2) organization, (3) system and (4) task.   
 
‘Circumstance’ is used to describe the situation or environment within which the project was 
operating. In this case, the operator had a bias towards production (i.e. early revenue creation) 
and established an unrealistic time period for commencing oil export even though there was a 
high degree of uncertainty associated with the size of the hydrocarbon reservoir. Producing and 
exporting oil efficiently would provide potential investors and shareholders with confidence that 
the operator was worthy of their investment.   
 
 
Figure 3. Blunt end themes 
 
Fundamentally, the strong emphasis on production contributed to generating rework. This was 
the operator’s first new-build FPSO project, albeit many employees had experience in the Gulf 
of Mexico, the North Sea, and West Africa. Despite this abundance of knowledge several 
fundamental design and engineering problems emerged during the FPSO’s construction. This, in 
part, was attributable to the contracting strategy implemented and the operator commencing 
detailed design before the hydrocarbon reservoir's conceptual studies had been completed. This 
resulted in an oversized FPSO and anchorage system, and a significant increase in CAPEX.  
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Rather than adopting an established Engineering Procurement Construction (EPC) or EPC 
Management (EPCM) contracting strategy, the operator decided to manage and coordinate the 
contractors themselves. The choice of arrangement was chosen to reduce CAPEX and to ensure 
that the project’s schedule would be met. 
 
‘Organization’ denotes rework related issues that arose as a result of the project’s organizational 
structure. The operator relocated dedicated staff to each of the contractors’ offices to manage the 
project. With contractors working in different time zones, communication was paramount, yet 
the operator failed to provide them with a detailed project definition and milestones. When 
questioned about this issue an interviewee stated: “we just wanted to get the project going, and 
so developed the project’s scope as we progressed and more information became available.” This 
approach resulted in their contractors being supplied with information at different times, which 
hindered their ability to plan work. A severe lack of project definition manifested itself in 
rework; for example, climate data was not provided in the scope, and air-conditioning had not 
been included in the constructed FPSO.   
 
Rework arose from the way the organizational ‘system’ related to interface management (IM).  
Collaboration and the fostering of communication between organizations are pivotal for efficient 
IM. The inadequate provision of technical data and documentation juxtaposed with the 
engineering being undertaken out of sequence resulted in on-site rework occurring during the 
FPSO's construction, assembly, testing and commissioning. While the operator assumed 
responsibility for IM to reduce costs, their attempt to transfer responsibility onto the contractors 
created unnecessary conflict. For example, the hull contractor’s contract was awarded based 
upon their specification. The operator fatally assumed at the award of the contract that their 
specification and the contractor’s mirrored each other. As a consequence, during construction the 
operator realized that there were specification issues that were not being addressed. For example, 
the vessel was being constructed to accommodate 100 people and 30 additional temporary crews, 
yet the operator’s specification required accommodation for 130 people. Changes were made at 
the operator’s request, which required significant rework.   
 
The ‘task’ emerged from the engineers not having the appropriate engineering knowledge and/or 
experience.  For example, lifeboats specified by the operator and installed onto the FPSO, failed 
international standards and so were removed and completely re-built. The absence of specified 
climate data also had significant ramifications in terms of rework encountered - hence, 
Norwegian engineers designed the FPSO based on North Sea climate specifications rather than 
those for the Timor Sea. Also, the helideck was designed to accommodate snow loading, and had 
been partly fabricated when this problem was discovered. An interviewee stated: “we had our 
own engineers in the office and we believed this sort of thing would not happen, yet they did.” 
The schedule compression coupled with a lack of knowledge and experience that was placed on 
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engineers was considerable because shareholders held expectations that the operator would 
deliver by a specified date. When under such pressure, people tend to take short cuts to meet a 
deliverable. It was perceived that the operator’s staff in the Norwegian engineer’s office had 
been overloaded and there were not enough resources allocated to managing the design and 
engineering process. 
 
Key decision-makers, such as the operator's senior managers, are rarely, if at all, cognizant of 
how their decisions impact operations at the sharp end as they focus on establishing objectives 
that meet their immediate goals (i.e. the push for production and profit maximization).  
 
4.2 The Sharp End: Upgrade to Safety Control System for an FPSO 
In contrast to above, this case examines issues that occurred at the sharp end. In this instance, an 
FPSO’s safety control system had caused frequent shutdowns, many of which were specious and 
led to oil production losses. To achieve a system with integrity and to enhance the production 
rate, the operator decided to upgrade the safety control system. However, due to a contractual 
dispute between the previous owner and the shipyard that was contracted to convert the tanker to 
an FPSO, many of the ‘as built’ drawings were unavailable.   
 
For the organization that was contracted to undertake the safety control system upgrade, the 
work consisted of four parts: (1) engineering design; (2) on-site engineering; (3) hardware; and 
(4) system installation. The engineering design had three specific phases: (a) information 
interpretation from the existing design; (b) new system design; and (c) Programmable Logic 
Controller (PLC) programming.  
 
The safety control system upgrade should have been a straightforward process, but a lack of 
available information created design rework. Although two weeks were originally scheduled to 
complete the physical works in a dry dock, document errors and omissions issued to the 
contractor hugely expanded this program to five months at considerable cost to the operator. The 
average production rate was 35,800 b/opd, and a total loss of production for five months resulted 
in a loss of 5.37M barrels of oil. Given the current price of crude oil, which was US$96/barrel 
(June 2013), the total capital loss equates to US$515.52 million. Decisions and work practices 
adopted at the blunt end can have adverse consequences at the sharp end. Figure 4 presents three 
themes that emerged from interviews held with an electrical and instrumentation (E&I) 
contractor who was operating at the coalface. From the contractor’s perspective, errors and 
omissions contained within documentation issued hindered productivity and jeopardized the 
potential integrity of the safety control system. For example, a gas detector was designed to trip 
the Public Address and General Alarm System (PAGA) when it was detected at a 20 percent 
Lower Explosive Limit (LEL). However, the correct design should have been at a PAGA 
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initiation of 10percent LEL for gas detection. As a consequence of this design error, the initiation 
of the PAGA was delayed and potentially endangered the safety of both the operators and 
equipment. 
 
The contractor’s engineers suggested that robust design audits and reviews would have identified 
this type of error. Errors and omissions were categorized as ‘Practice’ and arose due to people 
not executing their roles and duties adequately. While issues of commercial confidentiality 
restricted access to the operator, the contractor’s engineers and draftsmen indicated that when the 
decision was taken to place the FPSO in  dry-dock, the operator’s dedicated project team 
‘panicked’ as shareholders needed to be informed of production losses. In an attempt to address 
the problem, incomplete documentation was issued, envisaging that the contractor would identify 
any problems while on-site and subsequently raise Requests for Information (RFIs). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Sharp end themes 
 
The term ‘industry’ was used to describe rework that arose due to the structural properties of the 
industrial environment, specifically how engineers performed their work. The E&I had been 
drafted in Computer Aided Design (CAD), and when errors, omissions or changes were required, 
a draftsman was required to manually amend all drawings where they occurred.  
 
Noteworthy, when a change is required to a 2D CAD drawing, then the drawing and each 
corresponding view has to be manually updated.  This can be a very time-consuming and costly 
process.  Furthermore, as drawings are manually coordinated between views in 2D, there is a 
propensity for documentation errors to arise particularly in the design of complex electrical, 
control and instrumentation systems, which comprise of hundreds of drawings that are not to 
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scale and have to be represented schematically.  In this instance, information is often repeated on 
several drawings to connect each schematic together.  Consequently, the time to prepare the 
schematics can be a lengthy and tedious process, especially as the design gradually emerges and 
individual documents are completed.  Inconsistencies can manifest between the documents and 
therefore they must be re-edited and crosschecked before they can be issued for construction.    
For example, a heat detector specified in drawings had a 2ooN voting function, whereas in other 
contractual documentation it was 1ooN (one out of N). The issue was clarified through raising an 
RFI, but these inconsistencies adversely impacted workflow and productivity. Almost all the 
rework experienced arose from the design and documentation of the safety control system. The 
general perception among interviewees was that the operator had not devoted enough time to 
scoping their requirements and had grossly underestimated the extent of work required. The push 
for production had become the focal point, and the work that needed to be undertaken had almost 
become secondary. 
Organizations operating at the sharp end are the closest to the errors and omissions that arise and 
are often left with the responsibility of identifying and resolving them before rework occurs. 
Involving organizations operating at the sharp end in the decision-making process during the 
project’s formative stages can enable a systemic view of project performance. However, this 
requires organizations and people to challenge existing views and beliefs and not to accept that 
rework is simply an isolated incident in the system.   
 
Views at both the blunt and sharp end acknowledge that rework is a common problem, which 
receives limited attention. Mitigating rework occurrence requires more than simply 
implementing additional procedures and compliance checks, but rather the unlearning of current 
beliefs and views about the prevailing system and the engagement in a process of learning and 
re-learning from acquired experiences. 
 
5. Discussion 
Learning from an operational failure such as rework, which is experienced by other organizations 
presents a number of important challenges and opportunities [91]. According to Hora and 
Klassan [92] the main challenge appears to result from a lack of information that is readily 
available after an event has occurred. Invariably only the consequences are identified rather than 
the contributory factors that led to rework thus creating causal ambiguity [17].  Self-confidence 
in an organization’s own processes increases the likelihood of dismissing the possibility of 
project rework.  Yet, despite these challenges, learning from organizations that have experienced 
rework provides an opportunity for others to acquire new knowledge in order to prevent 
reoccurrence. Examples presented within this research provide a context to understand the nature 
of rework. The findings clearly indicate that production pressure triggered an array of unintended 
dynamics, which unknowingly influenced rework and therefore when the pressure to produce 
20 
 
increases there is often a tendency for the toleration of risk to be high [93]. Such a side effect can 
adversely influence an organization’s ability to accommodate errors made during FEED and 
construction. This organizational misconception can be interpreted as ‘organizational 
mindlessness’ [84]. Goh et al. [93] assert that the danger of this dynamic is that it forms a vicious 
cycle that can continuously encourage a stronger management focus on production and further 
distortion of risk perception. Thus, it acts to deteriorate the organization’s mindfulness in a cyclic 
manner. This vicious circle is arguably the core reason that provides fertile conditions for rework 
to manifest itself.   
 
According to Reason [75], organizations that possess a bias towards production are more likely 
to experience organizational accidents. Previous research has revealed that when rework arises 
during construction there is a propensity for safety to be overlooked as there is an immediate 
focus on rectifying the problem at hand and minimizing its impact on the project’s schedule [25]. 
It is noteworthy that the organizations participating in this study have impeccable safety records, 
but if rework occurs, then there is the potential for an accident to occur should the error not be 
identified. Supporting evidence for this claim is apparent within the significant number of 
engineering failures that have occurred due to design errors and omissions. For example, the 
collapse of I-35w Minneapolis Bridge (which killed 13 and injured 145) occurred due to gusset 
plates being incorrectly specified. Operators must have the capability to identify the systemic 
structure that promotes and gives rise to rework in order to adapt to increasingly complex project 
environments. An inability to see the broader system at play can lead to an organization 
possessing a ‘learning disability’ [94].  Such a disability often displays the following symptoms: 
a fixation on events (overemphasis on sudden and recent occurrences), an inability to notice 
subtle warning signs, and a delusion of learning from experience (lack of opportunity for trial 
and error).   
 
5.1 Managerial Implications 
To successfully curtail rework, managers who are charged with delivering complex projects 
(such as an FPSO) should adopt a systemic view during the formative stages when critical 
decision-making is undertaken. Managers are often faced with severe cognition challenges and 
are not in a position to make decisions that are rational and strategic [95]. In this situation 
managers tend to make decisions within familiar and relatively restricted boundaries formed by 
easily accessible information and available options [93]. The decisions made are rational within 
these familiar boundaries but not beyond. The dangers of decision-making within restricted 
boundaries can only be exposed if organizations are able to understand the broader systemic 
structure of projects within which they operate [93] and learn from acquired experiences [32]. 
Managers need to recognize that people’s actions and behaviors are influenced by their 
environment; therefore changing it is a far more effective strategy than trying to alter the 
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behavior of employees [95-97]. Thus, it is suggested that managers should openly de-emphasize 
the environment that places production at the top of its agenda to one that systematically 
examines the mechanisms and factors that shape the decisions and actions of people. This 
approach will ensure projects are delivered safely, on time, to budget and of the specified quality.   
 
Learning from errors is a controlled and mindful activity [76]. Learning requires attentional, 
motivational and cognitive resources [95]. Motivational variables drive and direct the allocation 
of cognitive resources in terms of how much and how long they will be allocated for learning 
[98]. Thus, managers need to develop and harness an environment where people are motivated to 
learn, particularly through external (i.e. direct line manager) and task feedback. When design 
reviews and checks are not adequately undertaken, an organization should ask why people 
behaved the way they did, and examine their mental models and environmental factors that affect 
decision-making. 
6. Limitations 
The research presented is not without limitations. First, the findings are not generalizable as only 
two examples were examined and further research is therefore required. Second, hindsight bias 
may have been present, though the line of inquiry was not anchored to outcome knowledge. 
According to Hendrikson and Kaplan [99], investigations that are anchored to outcome 
knowledge run the risk of not capturing the complexities and uncertainties that people are 
confronted with at the sharp end and why their actions made sense at the time. Thus, important 
lessons may go unlearned if the exercise is merely to retrace someone else’s decision landmarks. 
Interviews purposefully did not seek to find a specific cause as often no well-defined starting 
point exists to determine the essence of a causal chain. Furthermore, progressively working 
backwards through the causal chain is a time-consuming process and pragmatic considerations 
need to be taken into account such as resources and time constraints. Interviews undertaken did 
not attempt to establish where the organization or people went wrong, but rather tried to 
understand why their assessments and actions made sense at the time, if at all. And finally, 
retrospective analysis is limited, as systems are rarely static [100]. Organizations and the projects 
that they are involved with continually experience change, as adaptations are made in response to 
local pressures, short-term productivity and cost goals [101].  People adapt to their environment 
or change their environment to suit their purposes [94]. This propensity for systems and people 
to adapt over the life of a project reduces managerial effectiveness particularly when cost-
efficiency and increased productivity governs its decision-making processes. 
 
7. Conclusion  
Previous rework related research has tended to focus on causal factors and identifying a specific 
root cause. Yet, rework arises due to human error, which is the effect of symptoms derived from 
a systems environment where tools, tasks, and operations are interdependent. It is impossible to 
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identify a single cause for rework as a complex array of inextricably linked variables and 
conditions interact with one another to produce the event. In the cases studied, it was revealed 
that production pressure was an underlying latent condition that provided fertile conditions for 
influencing critical decision-making, and the behavior of people and organizations involved with 
FPSOs. In one case presented, the operator was an inexperienced organizational entity in 
delivering an FPSO, though its managers and engineers had extensive experience in their design 
and construction, which was acquired with previous employers. Despite such experience, rework 
still occurred, which resulted in cost and schedule overruns.  
 
This study demonstrates that the pressure to produce oil focused management’s attention onto 
production, which tended to distort their risk perception and lead to a further focus on 
production. This finding aligns with the current theory that has been propagated to explain 
organizational accidents. In the case of rework, the error or omission is identified before such an 
accident occurs. The danger is, however, if an error or omission is not identified the propensity 
for an accident or major catastrophe increases. It is irresponsible for managers and engineers to 
operate in (or even contribute to) unsafe environments, such as those offshore, to consider 
rework ‘normal’ under operating conditions. Notwithstanding the potential for loss of life and/or 
environmental damage due to failure of an offshore facility, there are implications for 
shareholders and those contractors working at the sharp end. For shareholders, there is the 
potential for dividends to be adversely impacted as production may be delayed. For contractors, a 
reduction in profit margins and productivity may be experienced, as they attend to rectifying 
problems that have manifested themselves from decisions made in the formative stages of the 
development process. 
 
Causes are fundamentally constructed rather than found and so it is suggested that future 
research should focus on explaining people’s behaviors to examine their mental models, 
environmental factors and other influences that affected their decision-making, which lead to  
errors and  subsequent rework. To undertake such research effectively, it is suggested that 
emphasis should be placed on working backwards through the causal chain, particularly using 
causal maps, to obtain rich understanding of the context in which decisions and behaviors 
occurred. 
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